IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

LESLIE BRIGGS, as next friend of T.W. and B.S.; EVAN WATSON, as next friend of C.R.; and, HENRY A. MEYER, III, as next friend of A.M., for themselves and for others similarly situated,) Plaintiffs,) Case No. 23-cv-81-GKF-JFJ v. ALLIE FRIESEN, in her official capacity as Commissioner of the Oklahoma Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services; and DEBBIE MORAN, in her official capacity as Interim Executive Director of the Oklahoma) Forensic Center, Defendants.

TRANSCRIPT OF STATUS HEARING

BEFORE THE HONORABLE GREGORY K. FRIZZELL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

NOVEMBER 1, 2024

REPORTED BY: BRIAN P. NEIL, RMR-CRR
United States Court Reporter

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DEPUTY COURT CLERK: This is Case No.

23-cv-081-GKF-JFJ, Leslie Briggs, et al., v. Allie Friesen, et al. Counsel, would you please state your appearances for the record.

MR. DEMURO: Good afternoon. May it please the court, on behalf of the plaintiffs here as preliminarily approved class counsel Paul DeMuro, Frederic Dorwart, Nick Southerland, and Brian Wilkerson. Also with us today is my partner, David Leimbach, and we've got the lead named plaintiff, Leslie Briggs, here as well, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

MR. DRUMMOND: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Present with me is Solicitor General Garry Gaskins, Assistant Solicitor General Will Flanagan and Senior Assistant Attorney General Erin Moore. Also present in their official capacities are Commissioner of Mental Health Allie Friesen and Executive Director of the Forensic Center Debbie Moran.

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

MR. DRUMMOND: And to the extent there's also counsel in the room, I object to them entering their appearance for purposes of this hearing.

THE COURT: Very well. Good afternoon. And we have counsel who have entered their appearance for the defendants in

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their official capacity. There have been two motions filed today that address that representation. But for the record, Mr. O'Connor or Mr. Inbody?

MR. O'CONNOR: Your Honor, Bill O'Connor, Brian Inbody, John Richer for Commissioner Friesen and Interim Executive Director Ms. Moran.

THE COURT: Good afternoon. We have one issue that we can address, I believe, without getting into representation, and we'll do that.

But, first of all, given that the contingency review board has disapproved the proposed consent decree, do counsel agree that the court should strike the January 15th, 2025, final approval and fairness hearing and direct the plaintiffs to provide notice that the hearing has been stricken?

MR. DRUMMOND: Your Honor, I'll address that. The order -- the protocol in the State of Oklahoma is that when the attorney has reached a point at which it seeks contingency review board approval, it asks the governor to convene such board.

In this case, the objection period is still open until, I believe, December 7th. Therefore, I have deemed it not ripe to request a contingency review board to convene to approve or disapprove the preliminary proposed consent decree. So I would — and what I anticipate doing is if there are no objections, then I will request the governor convene it.

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I think you and I and all people in this courtroom know that the matter's baked. The governor has no interest in approving anything that would benefit the state. So we can anticipate that he would deny it after I ask the board to be convened. So it leaves the court in somewhat of a conundrum but that's why you get paid the big bucks.

THE COURT: Well, frankly I don't know that I'm in a conundrum. I had asked the plaintiffs on August 15th at the hearing on the joint motion for preliminary approval of the consent decree whether or not the court could enter judgment prior to satisfaction of Section 200 and you and I engaged in the following exchange.

You said, "We do think the appropriate protocol is to do the preliminary consent. I've conferred with the Speaker of the House, the Senate Pro Tempore, and the Governor's office on the protocol, and the state is in agreement that we would request the court to enter the preliminary approval subject to legislative approval or the contingency review board.

"I think that they are seeking a threshold by this court, that the court is satisfied on a threshold basis of the parties' stipulated consent decree. Then with that, with the parties' agreement and the court's preliminary approval, then proceed with the formal approval."

And then I interjected, "So you would contemplate the approval by the contingency review board prior to the court

I said, I think the cake's baked. I mean, he has no interest in approving this.

THE COURT: All right. But given that, as a practical matter, we have a hearing set January 15th and that's before the legislature convenes. I need to strike that January 15th hearing because you don't have approval of the contingency review board and the governor has convened that board and they have voted 0-1, with one vote abstaining, to disapprove; correct.

MR. DRUMMOND: Correct.

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All right. So the court will then THE COURT:

strike the hearing --

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MR. DEMURO: Might I be heard on that first?

THE COURT: Oh, of course.

MR. DEMURO: As Your Honor knows, and the purpose of the hearing reflects, this case involves the intersection between the merits -- a Rule 23 consent decree and the merits, which is the broken competency restoration system and politics.

THE COURT: You're talking about the January 15th hearing?

MR. DEMURO: Yes. Absolutely.

(Discussion held off the record)

MR. DEMURO: And, Your Honor, given -- I want to answer your question directly, and my answer is no, but. But given the really unique situation that we're in, I would ask the court just a slight indulgence for me to explain what I think the context of your question deserves, please, Your Honor.

What has occurred here is extraordinary in this regard. The commissioner, who now is in the courtroom personally present, has asked to replace the attorney general as her attorney, and in so doing, Your Honor, filed a paper that conceded that the competency restoration system is broken and in need of reform and conceded that the consent decree -- a consent decree is the appropriate mechanism to fix it.

And so --

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THE COURT: I believe the governor had stated in remarks, what, before the legislature, the State of the State, that it needs to be fixed; correct?

MR. DEMURO: Correct. And so from the plaintiff's perspective, Your Honor, now the preliminary class counsel of somewhere between 250 and 300 people that were languishing in our county jails, there's essentially a concession from the commissioner herself in her personal and official capacity that the due process rights of 250 to 300 people are currently being violated.

THE COURT: Well, but the devil's in the details as usual; correct?

MR. DEMURO: It is, Your Honor. And so what are those details? The details that have been provided by the commissioner are invalid. She suggests in her paper that there's really one issue and it has to do with the provision of the statewide jail-based restoration.

Now, without getting into all of those details, the commissioner posits that under this consent decree the commissioner will be deprived of her statutory authority to provide class members with in-jail restoration services while they reside in jail.

That pronouncement is false and I can walk through the consent decree itself which specifically reserves to the department the right to provide whatever mental health services

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they deem appropriate to any class member in jail, including services under the competency restoration statute, notwithstanding any other provision in the consent decree.

How we got here, Your Honor, was that the prior commissioner rolled out a statewide in-jail restoration program that was a sham and that has now been conceded by the department as being a sham, as being misleading to the public, false statements to the public, to district attorneys, to stakeholders that there was an in-jail restoration program statewide when there wasn't. There has been a history of incompetence, head-in-the-sand management techniques, narcissism, and sheer lack of --

THE COURT: Let's dial some of this invective down, all right?

MR. DEMURO: I will. Here's my point, Judge.

As the preliminary class counsel of these 250 people, I'm on the one-yard line. I've got the defendants admitting that there should be a consent decree and that there is a broken system and the consent decree is the model to fix it, a consent decree. They're quibbling about one point which doesn't even exist truly.

So here's my -- so that's the context. We're on the one-yard line, Judge. We've worked long and hard for this consent decree --

THE COURT: Except you've got to deal with Section

statute.

THE COURT: It would be void by terms of the

legislature, this court cannot grant final approval.

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MR. DEMURO: Correct. But at this procedural juncture, we're not yet at the final hearing. As we have seen, there is a fast pace to these events, Judge. So I am imploring the court --THE COURT: The pace has been pretty quick just this morning. MR. DEMURO: Exactly, exactly. And I expect that there shall be more discussions. I'm implying the court in the context of an admitted broken system, essentially conceded daily violations of my clients' due process rights, a well-crafted consent decree that is a wise plan, the devil is in the details, that has already been preliminary approved, to give us some more time to work the political problem. Help me out with the timeline because THE COURT: the legislature usually doesn't convene until early February; correct? So when does the new speaker and the new president pro tem take office? MR. DEMURO: Yes. Well, I'm not a legislative expert but my understanding is --THE COURT: It's important to know that. MR. DEMURO: Yes. They get sworn in before then but the joint resolution couldn't be presented until the full legislature is back in session in early February. So --THE COURT: All right. Well, I thought you were going to suggest that a new contingency review board could

review it prior to January 15th and -
MR. DEMURO: That could happen too. I'm sorry.

didn't mean to interrupt. Yes, that could happen.

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THE COURT: So that's why I'm asking: When does the new speaker take office? When does the new president pro tem take office?

MR. DRUMMOND: May I assist?

MR. DEMURO: Yes. Sure, Your Honor.

MR. DRUMMOND: The new officers take oath of office November 13th of 2024. Bills are introduced on November 15th. The new term for the legislature begins on November 20th under Oklahoma State Statute 14 Section 80.35.11. Then the first organizational day is January 7th. So the contingency review board --

THE COURT: But don't the bodies have to elect the speaker and the president pro tem?

MR. DRUMMOND: They do so on the 13th of November.

THE COURT: On the 13th. And they're in session in November?

MR. DRUMMOND: They are -- they are the new speaker of the house and the new president pro tem my understanding is November 13th.

THE COURT: So you're saying the bodies have given preliminary approval and have elected to them take to take office on November --

MR. DRUMMOND: The newly elected representatives and senators are sworn in on November 3rd.

THE COURT: I see.

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MR. DRUMMOND: That day they vote on their organizational structure. That day we will have a new speaker and a new president pro tem.

It is my suggestion that following the objection period, I seek contingency review board convening and vote.

Now, the governor may very well block that. I anticipate if he thinks that he might lose, he'll block it, so we may still be at the point where we have to substantively try this case. But I suggest, and I join my adversary, Mr. DeMuro, in suggesting, that the court has the ability to pause, striking the January hearing date. There may, in fact, be a contingency review board that convenes and approves what is in the best interest of the State of Oklahoma.

THE COURT: All right. A subissue, it's been suggested to me -- and I don't know what the answer to this is -- that once the contingency review board has disapproved it, they can't go back and approve, that the process would have to start back at the beginning. Now, I don't know what sense that makes. Have you thought about that?

MR. DRUMMOND: I've read that statute and the related sections, and I'm not aware that we're now permanently blocked into perpetuity. That's not how I read it.

1 THE COURT: Yeah. I've reread it and I'm not 2 persuaded either of that. 3 Mr. DeMuro, your thoughts? Not only is it not in the statute, it's 4 5 not in any cases, the few that there are, if any. So I agree 6 that there's no permanent effect to the contingency review 7 board that they can't revisit their decision at any time, including when's there new constituents of the review board. 8 So we're in this -- we're in --9 10 THE COURT: You're having difficulty with that mic. 11 MR. DEMURO: Yeah. I'm trying to -- there we go. 12 How about that? Is that better? 13 THE COURT: Yeah. 14 MR. DEMURO: I'll just hold it. 15 So, Judge, this is a very unique procedural posture, 16 and as I started my comments, the intersection between the 17 necessity for political approval and the merits of what I now 18 believe have been confessed an ongoing constitutional violation of hundreds of Oklahomans. 19 20

And given the unique posture where we have a contingency review board whose constituents are going to be new in a month or less, several weeks or less, given the fact that we have a potential new legislative session coming up in February, given the fact that we're on the one-yard line, Judge, and we all invested a lot here, my plea to the court is

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what motivates people to give reasonable judges pressure,
pressure. So I beseech the court to keep this hearing
scheduled as scheduled. If we reach an impasse that I think is
insurmountable we'll notify the court and strike the hearing.
I don't think it's insurmountable.

I will end this part of my remarks with one comment.

If you do strike this hearing, Judge, which I strongly obviously do not want the court to do, I want as quick a setting as possible for a TRO and a preliminary injunction that the court will permit because we're ready to proceed on that basis as well for full-tilt adversarial litigation.

(Discussion held off the record)

THE COURT: All right. It would seem to me that to the extent that we -- and this is without briefing on the issue -- but just for my understanding of the statute having reviewed it, I don't think anything would preclude a newly constituted contingency review board from reviewing it and approving it or the legislature once convened reviewing it and approving it. The difficulty, however, is if changes are made to the proposed consent decree, then you would have to start the process over. Agreed?

MR. DEMURO: I agree that if there are anything -- I mean, change a comma maybe -- but if there are material changes to provisions --

THE COURT: Material changes.

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MR. DEMURO: Yes. Yes, Judge. The process being --

THE COURT: And everyone here, frankly, is in agreement that changes -- well, that this competency restoration system needs to be improved and fixed, everybody. The governor has stated it. It's been stated here. I think the attorney general told me at an earlier hearing that the governor stated in a State of the State speech that it needs to be fixed. Everybody's in agreement.

But there are details that are a part of this consent decree, one of which I have found is not authorized by statute, that being out-of-custody restoration. Not that it's a bad idea. That's left to the legislature. But I think you probably are right. I think that to the extent that you could get a newly constituted contingency review board to approve it prior to January 15th, we could go ahead.

MR. DEMURO: Yeah, I agree, Your Honor. And one other comment. There's no prejudice to my class in the court maintaining, at least for now, that hearing date. In fact, I think it would benefit the class for the reasons that I've discussed. I think having a firm date will motivate our ability to bring people together to close this out. There's no prejudice to those stakeholders who want to submit comments and, in fact, I welcome that. Actually I'd get more input and more comments.

So all the way around, Your Honor, I think there's no

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prejudice certainly to any party or class member or stakeholder for us to just wait and see what transpires over these next two months rather than striking the hearing.

THE COURT: I humbly suggest that in trying to do so, we turn down the political heat or the personal invective that's going both ways here. Because everyone is in agreement that competency restoration in Oklahoma needs to be fixed.

We've had this discussion here on the record, that with the proliferation of methamphetamine I see it every day. It simply increases the mental health problems that exist. We have what we call, you know, "dual-diagnosis treatment," mental health and drugs and I see those cases every day. So the problem is exploding at least in part due to the proliferation of methamphetamine.

So everybody here needs to work together in goodwill, if they can, to reach an agreement. But that's not legal; that's just my advice.

MR. DEMURO: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. DEMURO: We agree.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. DRUMMOND: Your Honor, because, as you've identified, we are affected by politics. So I cannot --

THE COURT: Well, let's not be. Let's be -- let's all be statesmen here.

MR. DRUMMOND: I cannot in good faith represent that the newly constituted contingency review board would approve it or disprove it.

THE COURT: Well, sure.

MR. DRUMMOND: Right.

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THE COURT: But for my purposes, I've been convinced here today, without the benefit of briefing, that I shouldn't strike it with the hopes that perhaps you can get the contingency review board to approve it. Now, if they don't, then we're talking about a legislative approval; correct?

MR. DRUMMOND: I have a suggestion. Again, speaking of pressure of litigation and the like, I think that you are correct in observing that all rational parties -- and I use that adjective intentionally -- would agree there's a problem that needs to be fixed and that the consent decree is the best mechanism and the most efficient mechanism to correct the deficiency.

THE COURT: Well, but that's obviously debatable as to the specifics of this consent decree.

MR. DRUMMOND: I would suggest it's not so debatable but I will yield to the court's observation.

THE COURT: Well, that's not my job.

MR. DRUMMOND: Right.

THE COURT: I am not a policymaker here and I steer away from being a policymaker. Certain people misunderstand

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the court's role in preliminary approval. I have no opinion as to the wisdom of these changes set forth in the consent decree. My preliminary approval simply is my agreement that it's legal, separate and apart from outpatient competency restoration, which I clearly stated in my order is not permitted under Oklahoma law.

MR. DRUMMOND: Understood. Hope eternal, a newly constituted CRB approves and we go on down the road. If it doesn't -- and I join Mr. DeMuro in the authenticity and transparency to this court -- we will let you know immediately, if it appears it either won't be convened or has been shot down.

I would suggest that the January 15th date be in the alternative. One, a final approval of the consent decree; or two, a hearing on injunctive relief.

THE COURT: I'm going to wait until either the legislature approves it or the contingency review board approves it. My recollection is that that's what this court did with regard to the Pinnacle Plan, we received the approval of the contingency review board prior to the final approval hearing. There's no reason to go through that process unless we get approval of the legislature or the contingency review board with due respect.

MR. DRUMMOND: Right. And I anticipate if the speaker or the president pro tem votes against approval of the

contingency review board, we can predict with great certainty that that chamber will not join the joint resolution. So I'm just suggesting because --

THE COURT: Probably. Not that the chamber could possibly override their leadership; right?

MR. DRUMMOND: Probably not in this state.

THE COURT: Probably not.

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MR. DRUMMOND: But my concern is not so much

Mr. DeMuro's clients, but the victims. That's my concern. I

want adjudicative relief to the victims of the state of

Oklahoma, and I'm simply suggesting that the court not further

delay a hearing on the injunctive relief. This office will

answer authentically and transparently on the failures of the

State of Oklahoma --

THE COURT: Well, that's up to you because the consent decree process is separate from an injunctive relief process, all right? I mean, I can candidly reveal to everyone here I received from the Bureau of Prisons a letter on June 24th about an individual who is in federal custody down in Fort Worth who they say can be released but no one will take her.

MR. DRUMMOND: Right.

THE COURT: Probation doesn't want to supervise her, and one of our magistrate judges is behind this because I'm worried about constitutional rights.

MR. DRUMMOND: Sure.

THE COURT: I fully understand your concern and the governor's concern. The governor's mentioned his own concern about this; correct?

MR. DRUMMOND: Yes.

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THE COURT: Right. So this is something we've got to get a hold of, both on the federal side and the state side. Fortunately my case is not a year old but it's -- there are few months that have passed and I'm concerned about her constitutional rights. I mean, she's in a medical facility at FMC Carswell and I'm going to get her out one way or the other.

MR. DRUMMOND: Yes.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. DRUMMOND: So the state is concerned about the victims' rights and that's why we would like to proceed without any other delay. So Mr. DeMuro and I will confer and probably make a joint application that we proceed on the merits, if it appears as though politically we just can't get there. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. We'll keep the matter on the docket for January 15th currently, although I suspect that I'll learn -- if this matter is presented to the newly constituted contingency review board, I'll learn. But I think it's important that something be filed of record because there's been a lot going on in this case in the media and no filings have been made here in court. So if something that is of a

legal notice needs to be filed, I'd ask counsel to do so.

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Now, we need to address these motions that have been filed today. We first received defendant's opposed motion to substitute counsel at docket No. 76. Later this morning we received the attorney general's motion to strike attorney appearances by Mr. O'Connor, Mr. Inbody, Mr. Richer, and Ms. Evans. A couple of preliminary questions there.

I've skimmed the briefs that are on file before the Oklahoma Supreme Court in the matter currently pending before the D.C. Federal District Court. The D.C. Federal District Court has certified to the Oklahoma Supreme Court some of these issues which are raised here today, although in a slightly different context because that specifically -- that case involves the governor directly hiring outside counsel to represent him in his official capacity and this is of two agency -- well, the commissioner and then the executive director. So there's a slight difference.

So some of my questions are, should I certify this question to the Oklahoma Supreme Court or -- and I saw that the briefing was completed, what, in July; is that correct?

There's a request for a hearing but I haven't seen anything further in that case; correct, general?

MR. DRUMMOND: Correct.

THE COURT: All right. But I'm posing these questions: Should I certify that question myself because it's

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in a slightly different context? Because I don't want to wait for the Oklahoma Supreme Court and then have you all say, well, Judge, that's in a different context, you need to decide this insofar as it deals with Ms. Friesen in her official capacity and Ms. Moran in her official capacity. Or, as I say, in the alternative, should I wait for the Oklahoma Supreme Court to make that decision before ruling on these two motions filed today?

MR. DRUMMOND: I think that's in large part the reason that there's the anti-retention movement. The governor needs three new Supreme Court justices that rule his way. So I think the law is clear and unequivocal --

THE COURT: Politics --

MR. DRUMMOND: -- and I'm addressing a former state judge who knows well the laws of Oklahoma. We had a foreign judge in the District of Columbia who I regret now agreeing to the certification because --

THE COURT: Who was that judge -- or is that judge? Sorry.

MR. DRUMMOND: He doesn't suffer fools. I know that.

THE COURT: And so you opposed certification?

MR. DRUMMOND: No. I believe we -- I'm going to let the solicitor general speak the truth. I will -- I will speak but it may not be accurate.

THE COURT: Mr. Gaskins, it's a pleasure to have you appear here today, sir.

MR. GASKINS: Thank you, Your Honor. The U.S. district judge is Timothy J. Kelly in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.

THE COURT: All right.

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MR. GASKINS: And, yeah, the state -- or the

Attorney General's Office is the one that sought the

certification there to get some clarity on this issue,

especially because it was the attorney general versus the

governor issue. That's not necessarily at play here because it

is the attorney general taking control of the case from an

inferior officer clearly. So --

THE COURT: Okay. And so if I'm hearing you correctly -- and you're the pointman on that D.C. litigation -- you're saying resolution by the Oklahoma Supreme Court of that issue doesn't necessarily resolve the issue here?

MR. GASKINS: I would say if the Oklahoma Supreme

Court ruled in the attorney general's favor, then we would

certainly win here, but I would say that we could win here even

if the Oklahoma Supreme Court rules against the attorney

general.

THE COURT: Spoken like a true advocate.

MR. GASKINS: Thank you.

U.S. District Court - NDOK

THE COURT: All right. And I will get to you,

Mr. Richer.

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So can I independently rule, even though I know that the Oklahoma Supreme Court is considering the case involving the governor's representation in the D.C. District Court case?

MR. GASKINS: I believe you can because the same sort of constitutional issues of the governor versus the attorney general are not necessarily at play here. This is more of a statutory issue. The governor has some slightly different constitutional arguments that he has made in the D.C. case about the attorney general coming in and taking over a case where the governor is a named party. That's not implicated here because the governor, of course, is not a named --

THE COURT: So you're saying there are no constitutional issues with regard to these two defendants?

MR. GASKINS: Oh, I would imagine the governor will continue to make constitutional arguments, but I think that any arguments that the governor makes in this case are much weaker than they are at least in the D.C. case. At least in the D.C. case, he's actually the named defendant. In this case, you have two inferior officers, and there are prior Oklahoma Supreme Court cases that make it clear that the attorney general can take over litigation from inferior state officers. There's just nothing about whether the attorney general can take a case over from the governor himself.

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THE COURT: All right. And I've read those briefs that are before the Oklahoma Supreme Court. Then you have the ethical argument. Just as you and I know, if you and I were representing an individual charged with murder, we couldn't take over that individual's case and plead that individual out as guilty if the client doesn't wish to be; right?

So, too, even though the Attorney General's Office is given the responsibility to represent an agency or an agency head, can you with a straight face argue to me that if the agency head disagrees with your opinion, that you can override that agency head's position as an attorney?

MR. GASKINS: Certainly, certainly. An attorney general, not -- this is not a situation where we're talking about a private attorney. We're talking about an individual that has been charged for representing the state so I think we have to identify who the client is first.

THE COURT: Well, I've seen, you know, the "take control" language.

MR. GASKINS: Right.

THE COURT: But you're honestly saying that if you and your client, the agency head, have a distinct disagreement, that you can override the position of your client?

MR. GASKINS: The client is the State of Oklahoma and so the commissioner and the executive director have been sued in their official capacities. The U.S. Supreme Court has

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said when a state officer is sued in their official capacities, that's the same as if the state itself has been sued. So the client is the State of Oklahoma. It isn't the commissioner. It isn't the executive director. It's the State of Oklahoma. The Oklahoma legislature under our constitution gets to designate who makes the call on behalf of the State of Oklahoma in litigation.

THE COURT: But, as I say, I've read these briefs, and one of the arguments made is basically it makes the attorney general the super executive with regard to matters that go into litigation.

MR. GASKINS: Sure. So whenever you have litigation you have to have someone who's the final decision-maker. The legislature, they could change this at any point, if they so choose. But as we sit here today, the legislature as of 1995 has designated the attorney general as the person that gets to make the final call.

the COURT: Okay. This is a little premature because I only have the opening briefs. Have you thought about -- since we have two briefs that are filed on the same day here, the normal response to these briefs -- and I have a schedule here before me -- the normal response date would be Friday, November 22nd, with replies due December 6th. Any objection to that schedule?

MR. GASKINS: I do not have any objection to that

schedule. But we are very familiar with these issues, so if the court so chooses, we could get a brief and response much faster than that.

THE COURT: Well, you got together the opening brief here pretty quickly.

MR. GASKINS: It was a busy morning, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I'll bet.

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MR. GASKINS: I don't have any objection to those deadlines, but I'm also happy to entertain a faster schedule, if the court is so inclined.

THE COURT: Okay. So what happens -- you're taking the position that if the Oklahoma Supreme Court rules in your client's favor, the attorney general, then that will be binding on this court? It would seem to me that you're right because it's a matter of Oklahoma law, both statutory and constitutional law, and not a matter of federal law at all; correct.

MR. GASKINS: Correct. The --

THE COURT: So should I because, as you know, we've got a few McGirt cases around here -- just had two McGirt criminal trials this month. Should we spend our judicial resources on this battle between the executive and the attorney general if the Oklahoma Supreme Court might moot out the issue for me?

MR. GASKINS: I mean, that is an issue of judicial

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economy which I'll defer to the court on. But I would say that the court may still have to rule on this issue. If, for some reason, the Oklahoma Supreme Court disagrees with the attorney general, that he cannot take over a case from the governor, the issues here are slightly different because the attorney general is taking over a case technically from an officer that's lower than the governor. It's not -- so, I mean, to me the issues are slightly nuanced that the court may still have to -- if the Oklahoma Supreme Court rules in favor of the governor there, this court, I think, would still have to address the unique circumstances here.

THE COURT: What of the argument, though, that these two officers are part of the executive and they report to the governor? Neither one of them are constitutional agencies; correct?

MR. GASKINS: They are not. But we do not have -yeah, we do not have a unitary executive in the State of
Oklahoma. We have a -- we have -- the executive office is and
the constitutional duties are put on various officers,
including the attorney general.

THE COURT: So I'm just curious to ask it. Let's say your client someday is interested in becoming governor. Is he interested in allowing the attorney general to override his policy decisions by virtue of being attorney general of the state?

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MR. GASKINS: I think the current attorney general is focused on upholding Oklahoma law and the Oklahoma

Constitution as it's currently written, and so that is -- I imagine that's all we would expect of a future governor as well. But as I said, the legislature is the one that ultimately has control of who gets to be the final decision-maker. And so as we sit here today, they have decided that the attorney general is the final decision-maker but legislation can change at any point.

THE COURT: We've had the discussion on the record in this case about the constitutional structure in Oklahoma, where the governor is referred to by political scientists as this is a weak governor system, the governor is vested with fewer powers and authorities than in other states. This would take even more away; correct?

MR. GASKINS: I think it would just -- it's not taking anything away; it's just interpreting the law as it's currently written. So I don't think he had that authority to begin with.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Richer, I'd be pleased to hear your position and come on up, sir. Welcome, sir.

MR. RICHER: Welcome, sir. Your Honor, John Richer for the defendants. I'll address initially your question on certification.

So in our paper that Your Honor read this morning, we,

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of course, wanted to bring the court's attention to the Supreme Court proceeding. I believe in my review of those pleadings —
I have not gone into detail — but I've read enough and I made a point in our paper to state that I think those are two distinctly different cases. The issue there and the issue here are different.

THE COURT: I think you're probably right.

MR. RICHER: And the reason --

THE COURT: And it seems to me that Mr. Gaskins is agreeing.

MR. RICHER: I think he does agree. I think the issue is an actual conflict versus a perceived conflict in that I think that one way or the other I think the court could decide the issue but this is a distinct Oklahoma law I think you can tell from the papers that we disagree with the attorney general on his authority to represent the commissioner in this case. There's going to be a legal disagreement on that issue under Oklahoma law, under the Oklahoma Constitution, the Oklahoma statutes, and the statutes that we are citing in our paper for other authority and the governor's authority to have appointed my law firm to represent the defendants in this case. The basis of our paper in our request for relief and our clients is a conflict of interest, and those are ethical issues that involve Oklahoma law.

My thinking on this, Your Honor, is that this is kind

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of the 800-pound gorilla in the courtroom. You're going to have to, I believe, Your Honor, respectfully address this issue one way or the other. It kind of goes with the other conversation we had earlier.

We represent and we've been appointed by the governor as special counsel to represent our clients. We have a very strong disagreement on the consent decree. That one yard that we kept on hearing about is everything to our client and we do want to work those issues out. But we have to have an agreement or an acknowledgment that we are here properly before the court to represent our client and that issue is now in dispute based on what we've seen this morning.

 $\ensuremath{\mathtt{THE}}$ $\ensuremath{\mathtt{COURT}}\colon$ Any objection to the briefing schedule that I --

MR. RICHER: No objection, Your Honor. That is fine.

THE COURT: All right. We'll set a briefing schedule on these motions. They are separate motions so I know the briefing will overlap, but there will be responses then due on Friday, November 22nd, with replies due on December 6th.

Now, following up on Mr. Gaskins' statement, he opines that if the Oklahoma Supreme Court were to decide in the D.C. case the certified question in favor of the attorney general, that would moot this out.

If I understand your position, you're saying it's

(Discussion held off the record)

MR. RICHER: Having conferred with my client, Your Honor, I think we would respectfully ask the court to certify the question of not only the conflict of interest issue -- it

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may be a little premature to do that -- but the issue of 51 O.S. 200A, which is purely a state law question.

THE COURT: Okay. You'll need to file a motion to certify. Within that motion to certify, try to craft a question or questions that need to be resolved by the Oklahoma Supreme Court.

MR. RICHER: We will do so, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Now, my next question really goes to Mr. DeMuro. Thank you, Mr. Richer.

MR. RICHER: Thank you, sir.

THE COURT: Mr. DeMuro, let me back up just one second.

I'm reminded that the current deadline to file a motion for final approval is December 9th. So I will need you to file on or before December 9th a notice as to whether or not you have been able to achieve approval by the contingency review board.

MR. DEMURO: Understood.

THE COURT: All right. So that will part of the minute order here today, that plaintiffs are required to file on or before December 9th whether or not contingency review board approval has been achieved. Go ahead.

MR. DEMURO: Yes, Your Honor. I don't want to overwork the football analogy, but we are in November after all in Oklahoma so it's probably apt. But given that there seems

to be widespread agreement by everyone involved, including the two -- the governor's recently appointed special counsel, although obviously we object to that appearance here, we're on the one-yard line. I wonder if the court could entertain the suggestion of ordering the parties to an expedited -- I'll use the words "settlement conference" -- with one of our talented magistrates to be done as quickly as possible to focus on whatever that one yard is to see if we can get across the goal line.

Because if we can reach -- I know we're going to win this case one way or the other. If we can reach consent decree agreement, it would be worth the troubles of having to redo the Rule 23 process to get agreement of the parties. We would have a much more effective plan.

THE COURT: Well, now, you've opposed the entry of appearance. Are you saying that these attorneys here could participate? When you say "agreement of the parties," are you limiting yourself to the attorney general, or are you including the party that wishes to be represented by new counsel?

MR. DEMURO: I would never turn down an opportunity to work with Mr. O'Connor. So I would definitely invite them assuming that the attorney general has no objection --

MR. DRUMMOND: For purposes of the settlement.

MR. DEMURO: -- just for purposes of the settlement while preserving -- and I use the word "settlement" which is an

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odd term in this context, but I think Your Honor knows what I mean.

THE COURT: Well, it worked in our foster care case.

MR. DEMURO: So the answer to that question would be yes. It could resolve the thorny issue that has been brought to the court's attention on the representation issue if everyone comes to an agreement about the actual consent decree. So I don't know how much hope I put in it, but, Judge, if we're that close, it seems like it could work.

It would need to be done quickly and it would need to be done with, I think, respectfully with one of this court's talented magistrates or someone of a similar stature.

THE COURT: Right. I'm informed that Magistrate

Judge Huntsman does not have criminal duty in November and so
that would be a possibility. I can see by a shaking of the
head, body language, the attorney general has no objection to
that approach; correct?

MR. DRUMMOND: No objection.

THE COURT: And what says Mr. Richer?

MR. RICHER: No objection, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. DEMURO: But it would have to be quick and we would all have to mind -- and this idea came to me -- we would have to mind the court's admonishment that we -- me first -- we dial down the rhetoric and we all work in good faith.

1 THE COURT: Absolutely. Now, remember, too, that I 2 would not have entered that order with respect to 3 out-of-custody -- or the legality of out-of-custody restoration unless I was convinced that that is Oklahoma law so I don't 4 5 want any end-around on that. And as I say, I'm not rendering a 6 policy judgment on that at all. But having looked at it 7 closely, the law in my view simply does not allow that 8 currently. 9 MR. DEMURO: Your Honor, my view, although 10 technically probably inaccurate, that's law of the case. Your 11 ruling on that has been made. We're not contesting that. 12 issue will have to be addressed, which we will do, at the 13 legislative level with the legislature. But no intention there 14 of trying to clawback that ruling at all. That's over. 15 THE COURT: All right. I'm going to have counsel, 16 lead counsel, meet me in chambers. We'll talk about a potential settlement judge, all right? Is there anything else 17 18 that we need to talk about here today? MR. DEMURO: Nothing from the plaintiff. 19 20 MR. DRUMMOND: Nothing from the state. 21 MR. RICHER: Nothing, Your Honor. 22 THE COURT: Very good. If there's nothing further, 23 we are adjourned. Thank you. 2.4 (The proceedings were concluded)

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